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COMMENT
Breaking the Trust: Adverse Possession
of Subsurface Minerals
Under Kentucky Law
INTRODUCTION
Kentucky case law has long imposed restrictions upon the
would-be adverse possessor of a mineral estate, the title to which
has been legally severed from title to the surface of the land. Spe-
cifically, Kentucky courts, in a series of cases interpreting Ken-
tucky Revised Statutes (KRS) section 381.430,1 have found that a
trust relationship exists between the surface owner and the
owner of the subsurface minerals. This Comment reviews the im-
plications of this trust relationship.
I. SUBSURFACE MINERAL ESTATES AND THE
DOCTRINE OF ADVERSE POSSESSION
Title to the surface of land generally can be severed from title
to the underlying minerals.2 Once the titles are severed,3 two sep-
arate property interests exist, both with all the attributes peculiar
to property ownership. 4 The principles of property law are ap-
plied separately to each interest as though each was a different
1 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.430 (Baldwin 1979) [hereinafter cited as KRSA]. See
text accompanying note 17 infra for the text of the statute.2 E. KuNTz, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL & GAS § 3.1, at 76 (1962).
3 According to one authority on this issue:
Only the owner of mineral rights is capable of effecting a severance of
title to the minerals. The most obvious method of severing title to minerals is
by grant or reservation in a deed. Before such deed accomplishes a severance
of title, it must be effective as a deed, which includes an acceptance of deliv-
ery by the grantee.
Kuntz, Adverse Possession of Severed Mineral Interests, 5 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 409,
424 (1960). See H. WILLIAMSs & C. MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAW § 224.2 (1959) (stating what
actions constitute a legal severance of the surface of land from underlying minerals).
4 E. KuNTz, supra note2, at § 3.1.
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parcel of real estate.5 This separate legal treatment can result in
complications, especially when the doctrine of adverse possession
is involved. 6 This doctrine allows title to real and personal prop-
erty to be acquired by possession which is either adverse or incon-
sistent with the possession or title of another.7
More specifically, adverse possession occurs when such pos-
session is actual, open, notorious, hostile, continuous and exclu-
sive, under a claim of right for the statutory period, The Ken-
tucky statute requires fifteen years of adverse possession before
title can be vested in the claimant under the doctrine. 9 These pre-
requisites for obtaining title by adverse possession apply equally
to both the surface estate and to the subsurface mineral estate.10
If adverse possession of the surface commences before title to
any mineral interests has been severed, then such possession will
extend to any underlying minerals." On the other hand, if pos-
session of the surface commences after mineral interests have
been legally severed, then no amount of surface possession alone
will extend to the underlying minerals. 12 Instead, there must be
an actual working of the mineral estate before title to the min-
erals can begin to ripen in the adverse possessor.13
Sd.
6 Id. § 10.4.
7 BLAcK's LAW DiCnTONARY 49 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
8 Tartar v. Tucker, 280 S.W.2d 150 (Ky. 1955).
9 KRSA § 413.010 (1979) provides: "An action for the recovery of real property may
be brought only within fifteen years after the right to institute it first accrued to the plain-
tiff, or to the person through whom he claims."
10 See Pond Creek Coal Co. v. Hatfield, 239 F. 622, 626 (6th Cir. 1917) (the statute
of limitations that applies in actions for recovery of real property also applies to action for
recovery of an interest in minerals).
11 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 3, § 224.1, at 347. See Saulsberry v.
Maddix, 125 F.2d 430, 433 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 643 (1942), where the court
stated:
The rule prevails in Kentucky that prior to a severance, mineral lands
form no exception to the general rule that the title of the owner of real prop-
erty includes not only the surface thereof, but also that which lies beneath
and above it; therefore, an adverse possession of the surface of mineral lands
before severance may ripen into title to the minerals as well as the surface.12 E. KuNTz, supra note 2, at § 10.4. See Crabtree v. Petroleum Exploration, Inc.,
137 S.W.2d 713, 716 (Ky. 1940).
13 In H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 3, § 224.1, at 340-41, the rule is stated
as follows:
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The reason given for not allowing surface possession alone to
ripen title to minerals after their legal severance is that the min-
eral owner has no cause of action for mere surface occupation.
The owner's interest in the surface extends only to easements
necessary for removal of the minerals. 4 The courts do not expect
the owner to take notice of mere surface occupation since he or
she has no legal recourse to prevent it.15 Only activity amounting
to a physical penetration of the mineral estate will be enough to
alert the mineral owner of adverse possession by a surface
owner.16
II. KENTUCKY'S STATUTORILY CREATED TRUST RELATIONSHIP
In Kentucky, even greater protection is given to the mineral
owner by KRS section 381.430. Under this statute:
Wherever the mineral or other interest in or rights ap-
purtenant to land in this state have passed, or shall hereafter
pass, in any way, from a claimant in possession of the surface
After a severance of the minerals, adverse possession of the surface will
not mature a limitation title to the minerals. Acquisition of such a title de-
pends upon taling possession of the minerals, by drilling or conducting other
mining activities. To prevent adverse possession, however, the severance
must have been effective. A purported severance by one not having title does
not bar acquisition of a limitation title to minerals. After a valid severance,
neither continued surface occupancy by the grantor nor adverse possession
of the surface by a stranger to the title will extend to the minerals, although
title to the surface may be acquired thereby.
Thus occupation of land under a chain of title which contains a min-
eral reservation is not adverse to the reserved minerals.
See Vorhes v. Dennison, 189 S.W.2d 269 (Ky. 1945); Curtis-Jordan Oil & Gas Co.
v. Mullins, 106 S.W.2d 979 (Ky. 1937); Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. House, 105
S.W.2d 804 (Ky. 1937); E. KuNarz, supra note 2, § 10.4, at 221.
14 H. WLLAMS & C. MEYEns, supra note 3, § 224.1, at 344-45. SeeE. KUNTA,supra
note 2, § 10.4, at 220-21:
The reasons given for such results are that the mineral owner is pre-
sumed to be in possession of the minerals; that the mere possession of the sur-
face is not inconsistent with separate ownership of the minerals; and that
there would be no disseisin of the severed mineral interest without an inva-
sion of the mineral domain by a working of the minerals, the mineral owner
having no right to exclude anyone from the surface and having only such
rights in the surface as is necessary to remove minerals.15 H. WLLIAMS & C. MmEns, supra note 3, § 224.1, at 345.
16 Id. at 340.
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of land, the continuity of the possession of such mineral, inter-
ests and rights shall not be deemed thereby to have been
broken; but the possession of the surface by the original claim-
ant thereof, from whom such mineral, interest or rights
passed, or by those claiming through or under him, or by vir-
tue of a judgment against him in an action to which the holder
of mineral, interests or rights is not a party, shall be deemed to
be for the benefit of the person, his heirs and assigns, to whom
the mineral, interests or rights have passed. 17
This statute creates a trust relationship between the surface
owner and the mineral owner so that the surface owner holds the
minerals solely for the benefit of the true mineral owndr. 8 The
surface owner's possession becomes adverse to that of the true
mineral owner only when the surface owner successfully repu-
diates the trust by communicating clearly and unmistakably to
the mineral owner, through acts or words, that the minerals are
no longer being held for his or her benefit. 19
III. REPUDIATING THE TRUST
One interpretation of the statutory language is that actual
penetration and working of the mineral estate2 by the surface
17 KRSA § 381.430,(1979). The statute was originally enacted in February of 1906,
as Kentucky Statute § 2366 a-i. The language of the original statute was preserved with
minor modifications in the current version.
18 Kentucky River Coal Corp. v. Singleton, 36 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Ky. 1941). The
federal district court observed that "[u]nder this statute, the Kentucky authorities are
unanimous in holding that after severance of the mineral title one who acquires possession
of the surface from the same grantor is deemed to hold possession of the minerals as trustee
for the holder of the mineral title." Id. at 125.
19 Id. The court emphasized that:
[I]n the absence of an explicit disclaimer and clear repudiation of this sub-
sisting relationship in a manner sufficiently open and notorious to bring
home to the mineral owner knowledge or notice of the hostility of the sur-
face holder's possession, the surface holder, being a trustee in possession, can
never acquire the title of his cestui que trust by any length of possession for
his possession never becomes adverse. The possession of the mineral owner
being thus preserved and protected by the statute is not lost nor its continuity
interrupted by any length of non-user.
Id. See Diederich v. Ware, 288 S.W.2d 643, 646 (Ky. 1956); Petroleum Exploration v.
House, 105 S.W.2d at 806.
2 The issue as to what substances are included in the mineral estate frequently
arises. A helpful discussion is found in R. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAs § 1.2
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owner is enough to both repudiate the trust and satisfy the re-
quirements of adverse possession. This conclusion logically fol-
lows from the reasonable expectation that the mineral estate
holder will take notice of mining or drilling operations on the
surface and know that attempts are being made to adversely pos-
sess the mineral estate holder's interest. It also is logical to think
that mining or drilling is the type of activity which will alert the
mineral owner clearly and unmistakably that the surface holder
no longer keeps the minerals for his or her benefit.
Unfortunately, the common law in Kentucky is unclear as to
what actions are sufficient to find the surface owner has repu-
diated the trust and gained title to the underlying minerals
through adverse possession. A review of some court decisions sug-
gests that actual working of the mineral estate by a surface pos-
sessor without a separate formal repudiation of the trust will
never satisfy the requirements of the doctrine of adverse posses-
sion. 2' In one case, the Court reasoned that the requirements
could not be satisfied because the statutory trust creates a pre-
sumption that the surface owner's attempts at mineral possession
are permissive; thus, the surface owner's holding of the minerals
could never be hostile until a separate formal repudiation of the
trust had occurred. 2 On the other hand, some Kentucky deci-
sions imply that the surface possessor's working of the mineral
estate is in itself sufficiently adverse to satisfy the doctrine.23
(1971), in which the author states: "A conveyance or reservation of 'minerals" or 'oil, gas
and other minerals' will generally include substances having a special value apart from the
land itself, whose removal will not substantially interfere with surface usage, and which
are traditionally not associated with surface ownership."
For a discussion of how Kentucky cases have interpreted the word mineral, see
generally Rowe v. Chesapeake Mineral Co., 156 F.2d 752, 754 (6th Cir. 1946), cert. de-
nied, 329 U.S. 776 (1946) ("It is the established rule under both state and federal law that
the term 'mineral' includes gas and oil as well as solid minerals"); Kalberer v. Grassham,
138 S.W.2d 940, 942 (Ky. 1940) ("The word 'mineral' is not a definite term and is suscep-
tible of limitations or extensions according to the intention with which it is used and each
case must be decided on the language of the instrument, the surrounding circumstances
and intention of the grantor").
21 See Ward v. Woods, 310 S.W.2d 63, 65 (Ky. 1958); Diederich v. Ware, 288
S.W.2d at 646; Piney Oil & Gas Co. v. Scott, 79 S.W.2d 394,397 (Ky. 1934).
2 310 S.W.2d at 65.
23 See Crabtree v. Petroleum Exploration, Inc., 137 S.W.2d at 713; Hoskins v.
Northern Lee Oil & Gas Co., 240 S.W. 377 (Ky. 1922).
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A. Requirement of a Separate Formal Repudiation
Kentucky's highest court first emphasized the need for a sep-
arate formal disavowal of the trust in Piney Oil and Gas Co. v.
Scott.s4 In that case, the owner of an 800-acre estate had, in
1859, granted the minerals under his land to another party. The
descendants of the grantor eventually divided the 800 acres into
smaller tracts for individual sale. None of the subsequent general
warranty deeds for these smaller parcels mentioned any excep-
tion for the mineral interests. By 1931, Piney Oil and Gas Co.
had purchased the mineral rights under the 800 acres from the
original grantees, and it subsequently brought suit against the
fifty-two owners who settled within the 800 acres to quiet title to
the minerals. The surface owners claimed they held title to the
minerals through adverse possession, even though some of them
had never worked the minerals under their tracts or had mined
for domestic use only. The Court rejected the surface owners'
claim for two reasons: first, occasional domestic mining does not
satisfy the continuity element required by the adverse possession
doctrine;25 and second, the surface owners had not given formal
notice to the fee owner of the mineral estate repudiating their
trustee relationship with him. Without such formal notice, the
minerals could only have been held for the benefit of their true
owner, the fee owner of the mineral estate.26 The Court, com-
menting on the trustee relationship, stated:
This is a most serious handicap upon a would-be disseisor. [The
original grantor] and those claiming under him were not there-
after in as good a position to initiate a disseisure as would have
24 79 S.W.2d at 394.
25 Id. at 399. Traditionally, courts have held that domestic mining does not support
an action for adverse possession because the intermittant nature of domestic mining fails to
satisfy the continuity requirement of the adverse possession doctrine. See Claybrooke v.
Barnes, 22 S.W.2d 390, 392 (Ark. 1929); Prewitt v. Bull, 27 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Ky. 1930);
McPherson v. Thompson, 261 S.W. 853, 854-55 (Ky. 1924); Central Trust Co. v. Harless,
152 S.E. 209, 213-14 (W. Va. 1930). See also Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 124 (1954) (discusses
acquisition of title to mines or minerals by adverse possession). Cf. Brockman v. Jones, 610
S.W.2d 943 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (domestic mining does not satisfy the hostility require-
ment of the adverse possession doctrine).
2 79 S.W.2d at 397.
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been a stranger. All a stranger would have to do would be to
begin the necessary steps to accomplish the disseisin and per-
fect them, but, before any of these surface owners could be-
come a candidate for the position of disseisor, it would be
necessary for him to rid himself of his present position of
trustee in possession.27
If this language is taken literally, the near impossibility of an
owner ever losing a mineral estate through the adverse possession
of a surface owner becomes apparent. No amount of mining ac-
tivity will be sufficient to satisfy the adverse possession require-
ments since such workings of the underlying minerals by a sur-
face holder will never be hostile. The mining activity, deemed to
be for the benefit of the true owner, will remain permissive until
a separate repudiation of the trust occurs.
This requirement of formal repudiation becomes more
onerous in the case of surface owners who take title to the proper-
ty through a deed which makes no mention of a previous mineral
severance. These surface owners will never repudiate the trust
because they do not know that another person holds a fee interest
in the minerals. These owners are likely to work the mineral
estate under the belief that it is their property. But under the
trust rationale, no amount of possession of the minerals will cause
title to ripen until a separate repudiation occurs. Therefore, al-
though the mining activity may have been continuous for over
fifteen years, the true mineral owner can still return to claim his
or her interest.
Piney Oil's requirement of separate repudiation of the trust
by the surface owner in addition to actual penetration of the
mineral estate was clarified in a later Kentucky case, Diederich
v. Ware,2 where the Court gave an example of a type of repudi-
ation which would constitute open disavowal of the trust. In
Diederich, the owner of a fifty-six-acre tract, conveyed in 1859
the underlying oil estate to the Gray-Mellon Oil Company. The
validity of this conveyance was upheld in a 1927 cases which
27 d. at 398.
2 288 S.W.2d at 643.
2 Gray-Mellon Oil Co. v. Fairchild, 292 S.W. 743 (Ky. 1927).
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construed the 1859 deed in favor of the company as giving it a fee
interest in the of1.30 Testimony in that case revealed that there
had been adverse drilling activity on the property.31 In 1956, a
subsequent owner of the oil interest brought suit against the sur-
face owner to gain royalties from two wells which had been pro-
ducing on the property for more than fifteen years. The Court
held in favor of the surface owner, finding that he had fulfilled
all the elements of adverse possession, including hostility, by suc-
cessfully repudiating the trust and penetrating the mineral
estate. The Court, acknowledging Piney Oil, stated:
In the Piney Oil case... there is some language suggesting
the surface owner must give the mineral owner formal notice
he is taking the minerals under an adverse claim in order to re-
pudiate the trust and initiate limitations. In the present case,
the appellant's predecessor in title, the Gray-Mellon Oil Com-
pany, had actual notice as early as 1925 that oil was being
taken from the G.W. Webb tract mentioned in their mineral
deed. The notice was formal in that it appears in testimony in
the record of the case of Gray-Mellon Oil Co. v. Fairchild, 219
Ky. 143, 292 S.W. 743, in which we considered the same 1859
oil deed. We think that this notice, together with the open and
notorious operation of these two wells since that time, was suf-
ficient to cause limitation to run against the mineral owners. 32
The need for a separate repudiation was reiterated in a sub-
sequent decision by Kentucky's highest court, Ward v. Woods:33
30 The general rules of adverse possession relating to solid minerals such as coal may
not be appropriate where fugacious minerals such as oil and gas are concerned. Adverse
possession of solid minerals theoretically can be limited to those minerals over which the
surface owner has actual or potential possession; the surface owner can adversely possess
the immediate area of the mining activity.
Such an approach does not appear to work where fugacious minerals are con-
cerned. Migratory by nature, oil and gas do not stay in place once drilling activity begins.
Instead, the entire substrata is altered by natural forces which begin pushing the fugacious
minerals to the mouth of the well. Thus, the adverse possessor of these fugacious minerals
would have immediate potential occupation or use of the minerals underlying all of the
surface, not just that portion at the surface in the vicinity of the drilling activity. For a de-
tailed discussion of these concepts, see Sanford v. Alabama Power Co., 54 So. 2d 562 (Ala.
1941); Diederich v. Ware, 288 S.W.2d at 643; Cohen, Property Theories Affecting the
Landowner in a New Oil and Gas Producing State, 11 ALA. L. REv. 79 (1958-59).
3' 292 S.W. at 744.
32 288 S.W.2d at 647.
33 310 S.W.2d at 63.
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We have held may [sic] times that in order for the surface
owner to obtain title by adverse possession to the minerals
which constitute a severed estate, he must have openly dis-
avowed or repudiated the trust declared by the statute and
have exercised dominion over the mineral estate and brought
notice thereof to the owner of that estate.4
The foregoing cases indicate that, under Kentucky law, a
surface owner who seeks title to severed mineral interests by ad-
verse possession must, in order to satisfy the requirements of the
doctrine of adverse possession,35 show a separate repudiation of
the trust imposed under KRS section 381.430. 0 Ordinarily when
courts apply the adverse possession doctrine the physical posses-
sion of the property in and of itself is sufficient to satisfy the hos-
tility requirement. But in the context of subsurface minerals
which would have been legally severed from the surface, Piney
Oil, Diederich and Ward hold that mere possession of the min-
erals by a surface owner is not hostile. Instead, such possession is
treated as permissive possession by a trustee for the benefit of the
cestui que trust. The hostility element is satisfied only after the
trust has been repudiated. Thus, these three cases apparently
establish that, in Kentucky, mining or drilling activity must be
coupled with formal repudiation for the possession by a surface
owner to be adverse.
B. Repudiation Solely by Working the Mineral Estate
Unfortunately, the principle set forth in the foregoing three
cases has not been consistently applied in other decisions. For
example, in Crabtree v. Petroleum Exploration, Inc. ,3 the Court
held that a surface owner, in order to gain title to the previously
severed mineral interest, must either develop and work the min-
eral estate continuously under claim of right for the statutory
period or repudiate the trust and give the mineral owner notice
34 d. at65.
- See notes 8-10 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the elements of the
adverse possession doctrine.
36 KRSA § 381.430 (1979).
37 137 S.W.2d at 713.
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of the repudiation.," The Court in Crabtree viewed repudiation
and possession as alternative methods of achieving ownership
rather than as distinct elements which are both necessary for ad-
verse possession.
It seems doubtful, however, that mere repudiation of the
trust without exercise of actual dominion over the minerals
would ever be enough for adverse possession. If repudiation were
by formal notice and no physical acts occurred on the land other
than mere surface occupation, the mineral owner would never
have a cause of action against the surface posesssor because his or
her legal rights would not extend to ousting the surface owner for
mere surface occupation.
Crabtree was not the first case which failed to view formal
repudiation of the trust as a distinct element necessary for ad-
verse possession of a severed mineral estate. In Hoskins v. North-
ern Lee Oil and Gas Co.,39 the Court apparently ignored the for-
mal repudiation requirement and instead implied that the exer-
cise of dominion over the minerals, without more, could vest title
in the adverse possessor.40 The case involved a dispute over oil
and gas rights. In 1901, the owner of an eight-acre tract sold his
land, reserving the mineral rights in all coal, oil, iron and gas in
himself. A subsequent holder of the surface claimed that she held
title to the minerals under a title bond given to her by the orig-
inal mineral owner. She also claimed that her domestic mining
activities entitled her to the minerals under the adverse posses-
sion doctrine. The plaintiff,, Northern Lee Oil Company,
claimed title to the minerals traceable to the original owner. 41
The Court held that the surface owner's bond was invalid
and that she could not assert adverse possession because she had
failed to mine the property continuously for the statutory
period. 42 In discussing the extent of mining activity needed for
the surface holder to gain title through adverse possession, the
Court said:
-
8 Id. at 716.
-1 240 S.W. at 377.
40 Id. at 380.
41 Id. at 377-78.
42 Id. at 380.
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The only way the statutes can be started running in favor of
the surface holder, as against the owner of the mineral, is by
the former taking actual possession of the mineral under claim
of right, by opening mines or wells and operating the same.
When this possession has continued for the statutory period,
title to the mineral by adverse possession is perfected. 43
The Court in Hoskins failed to mention the need to separately re-
pudiate the trust in order to satisfy the hostility requirement of
adverse possession, instead indicating that the statute begins to
run in favor of the surface owner once a continuous working of
the mine begins. One may infer from the Court's language that
repudiation is not necessary to establish hostility but, rather, that
working of the mineral estate alone is sufficiently adverse to satis-
fy the doctrine.
The most recent Kentucky case dealing with adverse
possession of subsurface minerals fails to clarify whether repudia-
tion plus actual working of the mineral estate is necessary for
adverse possession. In Brockman v. Jones,4 decided in 1980, a
landowner conveyed his property to another party while reserv-
ing all coal rights in himself. Subsequent surface owners obtained
title to the land through two deeds, neither of which mentioned
the original coal reservation.45 The surface owners began mining
coal on the property for domestic use as early as 1957. They
brought suit to quiet title to the mineral rights because they
wished to execute coal leases.46 The appellate court, finding for
the mineral owner, held that the surface owners' mining for
domestic use did not constitute open disavowal or repudiation of
the statutorily created trust. 47
This holding is inconsistent with Piney Oil,4" Diederich49 and
Ward5° in two respects. First, the language of the opinion implies
43 Id.
4610 S.W.2d at 943.45 d. at 944. Testimony revealed that the surface owners had learned of the reserva-
tion of coal rights from one of their predecessors in title.
4Id.
47 1d. at 945.
48 310 S.W.2d at 63.
41 288 S.W.2d at 643.
50 79 S.W.2d at 394.
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that more extensive or commercial mining activity would have
been sufficient to repudiate the trust.5' If this implication is in-
tended, then it is possible that the court in Brockman believed, as
did the Court in Hoskins,5 2 that mining activity alone can be suf-
ficient to establish adverse possession without a separate formal
repudiation of the trust. Second, the court articulated a new ra-
tionale for excepting domestic mining from application of the ad-
verse possession doctrine. Previous cases5 held that the require-
ment of continuity was not met by mining for domestic use be-
cause such mining extracted coal only when needed and not con-
tinously. Under the Brockman rationale, domestic mining is ig-
nored because the requirement of hostility is missing. The court
did not regard domestic mining as truly adverse to the mineral
owner's interest.
IV. A NEED FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE LAW
The preceding review of Kentucky cases reveals confusion as
to the requirements which a surface owner must meet in order to
establish adverse possession of previously severed mineral inter-
ests. Some cases5 indicate that continuous mining activity alone
will serve both as a repudiation of the trust and as actual, open,
notorious and hostile possession of the minerals. Conversely,
other casesss clearly call for a separate repudiation of the trust be-
fore any working of the mineral estate will be considered ad-
verse.
The need for clarification of the law in this area is obvious in
view of Kentucky's stature as a major coal producing state and its
desire to increase its share of the world coal market. In 1981,
total consumption of United States coal reached 838 million
tons.0 The U.S. Department of Energy predicted that 1982 coal
51 The court stated: "It is clear from the record that appellants only mined for
domestic use and that their mining activity was insufficient to constitute open disavowal
or repudiation of the trust declared by statute." 610 S.W.2d at 945 (emphasis added).
52 240 S.W. at 377.
53 See note 25supra.
54 See notes 37-47 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
See notes 24-34 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
56 Guecioni, 1982: Very Good, if. . ., COAL MINING & PaOCESSINC, Jan. 1982, at
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consumption would hit a record-breaking 800 million tons. 7 The
competitive position of coal in relation to oil and gas grows more
favorable due to the fact that coal can be used to produce one
million BTU's of energy for approximately one-third of the cost
of using oil and for approximately two-thirds of the cost of using
natural gas.-" Meanwhile, Kentucky continues to have one of the
largest reserves of premium bituminous coal in comparison to
fourteen of the other major coal producing states. 59 As of 1974,
reserves in Eastern Kentucky alone were estimated at 4977.03
million net tons. °
Disregarding for the moment the unsettled question of
whether, in Kentucky, a surface owner must formally repudiate
his or her trust relationship with the owner of the mineral estate
in order to adversely possess the mineral interest, a more basic
question remains: Does the doctrine of adverse possession, as
generally construed,61 stand as an obstacle to mineral develop-
ment? A number of commentators have written extensively in re-
cent years on the need to clear title to dormant mineral inter-
ests,6 2 and many have expressed the view that the doctrine of ad-
verse possessior provides little assistance in attaining this desired
result. They reason that a prudent mineral developer is unlikely
to attempt to gain title to a severed mineral estate by actual
working of the underlying strata as required by the doctrine. 3
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 NATIONAL COAL ASSOCIATION, COAL DATA 1-8 (1979-80).6
0 Id.
61 See notes 8-10 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of adverse possession.6
' See Kuntz, Old and New Solutions to the Problem of the Outstanding Unde-
veloped Mineral Interest, 22 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 81 (1971); Outerbridge, Miss-
ing and Unknown Mineral Owners, 25 RocKy MTN. Min. L. INST. 20-1 (1979); Polston,
Legislation, Existing and Proposed, Concerning Marketability of Mineral Titles, 7 LAND
& WATER L. REv. 73 (1972); Smith, Methods for Facilitating the Development of Oil and
Gas Lands Burdened with Outstanding Mineral Interests, 43 Tx. L. REV. 129 (1964);
Note, Severed Mineral Interests, a Problem Without a Solution?, 47 N.D.L. REv. 451
(1970).
63 See, e.g., Kuntz, supra note 62, at 94. (If title to a severed mineral interest is nei-
ther lost by non-user nor acquired by adverse possession of the surface which was begun
after title to the mineral interest was severed, the mere passage of time does nothing to re-
move the problem of the outstanding mineral interest, but merely serves to increase the
likelihood of further fragmentation of the title); Outerbridge, supra note 62, at 20-9 ("Al-
though a severed mineral interest may be 'possessed' by actual working of the minerals, it
is unlikely that any prudent mineral developer would intentionally adopt this approach as
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Costs for mineral development are too high to encourage such an
uncertain method of acquiring title.64 The mineral severance has
often occurred so many years earlier that the true owner is miss-
ing or unknown. Consequently, it is impossible to acquire min-
eral rights by the conventional means of obtaining the owner's
consent. As noted in one treatise:
While the rule [requiring penetration of the mineral estate
for adverse possession] appears to be sound enough from the
mineral owner's point of view, it can cause economic inconve-
nience to the public. Severed minerals cannot be developed
until the owners consent to their development. The older the
severance (and many go back to the 19th century), the greater
the difficulty in locating the owners. The problem is further
complicated if the severance was of small undivided mineral
interests, as was common for speculation purposes in the
1920's. Present development of such areas depends upon ob-
taining the consent of nearly all the mineral owners, a task that
could involve locating thousands of persons.65
Prodded perhaps by the "economic inconvenience to the
public" which results from minerals lying dormant indefinitely,
some states have developed alternatives to the adverse possession
doctrine as a means of clearing title to dormant mineral interests,
such as reversion of title to the surface owner if the mineral estate
is not worked. 6 This is not the case in Kentucky, however, where
a means of acquiring an outstanding mineral interest"); Smith, supra note 62, at 161:
64 Smith, supra note 62, at 160-61. As the author noted:
[Tihere seems little likelihood of utilizing adverse possession or user as an ef-
fective method of eliminating dormant mineral claims which hinder de-
velopment. Drilling and production will not take place if the operator is
aware of a large outstanding claim; thus, title to oil and gas [or coal] by ad-
verse possession will usually be acquired only when the operator has erro-
neously assumed that he or his lessor has good title.
Id. See Outerbridge, supra note 62, at 20-5, 20-6.
6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 3, at § 224.1.
6 For example, the state of Louisiana has developed the doctrine of liberative pre-
scription. Under this doctrine, a mineral "fee" is classified as a servitude, and nonusage for
a period of ten years will result in its prescription in favor of the owner of the surface
estate. Smith, supra note 62, at 161-72.
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the true owner of a mineral estate continues to hold title regard-
less of the length of non-user. 67 And, as this Comment previously
noted,6 the predicament is exacerbated by the confusion in Ken-
tucky as to the steps that surface owners must take to perfect title
through adverse possession. Must the surface owner who wishes
to adversely possess a severed mineral interest develop and work
the mineral estate continuously under claim of right for the statu-
tory period and communicate to the mineral owner a formal re-
pudiation of the statutory trust? The Kentucky courts have yet to
answer this question definitively.
CONCLUSION
In view of the importance of coal to the Commonwealth of
Kentucky, the state legislature should examine the feasibility of
adopting a more effective method for assuring that missing and
unknown mineral owners do not hamper the advantageous de-
velopment of mineral interests. Specifically, the legislature,
where mineral estates are concerned, might consider replacing
the largely ineffective adverse possession doctrine with a system
which would work a forfeiture of the mineral estate in favor of
the surface owner after a specified period of non-user. 9 Alterna-
tively, the Kentucky Supreme Court or the legislature, at the
earliest opportunity, must definitively establish the requirements
that a surface owner must satisfy in order to perfect title in a
mineral estate by adverse possession. In the interest of efficient
utilization of our state's resources, such requirements should not
mandate that a surface owner communicate to the mineral
owner a formal repudiation of the statutory trusts.
M. Gabrielle Hils
67 Curtis-Jordan Oil & Gas Co. v. Mullins, 106 S.W.2d at 979; Piney Oil & Gas Co.
v. Scott, 79 S.W.2d at 394; Scott v. Laws, 215 S.W. 81 (Ky. 1919). For a detailed discus-
sion of the loss of mineral rights by non-user, see Outerbridge, supra note 62, at 20-1;
Smith, supra note 12, at 129.
6 See notes 53-55supra and accompanying text.
9 The theory of extinguishment of dormant mineral interests by non-user has been
adopted by at least ten states. Outerbridge, supra note 62, at 20-27 to 20-45. Such a statute
must be carefully drafted, giving due consideration to constitutional due process require-
ments, and include 1) a provision that non-user creates a rpbuttable presumption of aban-
donment rather than absolute loss of property, and 2) a provision for notice to the mineral
owner which meets constitutional standards, coupled with a right to a hearing. See id.
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